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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Nathan Howard conditionally pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance,
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. In his motion, Mr. Howard
claimed he was unreasonably seized, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, when a
sheriff’s deputy stopped him on the highway as he pulling a load of firewood. The district court
concluded the deputy had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Howard was stealing firewood, and
that the deputy was justified in conducting an investigatory stop to see if Mr. Howard had proof
he owned the wood.
On appeal, Mr. Howard argues the deputy did not possess sufficient facts to support a
reasonable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment, and the district court’s contrary
conclusion was erroneous as a matter of law. He respectfully asks that the denial of his motion
to suppress be reversed and that his conviction be vacated.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On October 10, 2019, at around 10:30 at night, Washington County Sheriff’s Deputy
Jerry Jakich saw Mr. Howard driving a truck down Highway 95 pulling a trailer load of
firewood, split-up and ready for use in a fireplace. (R., p.55; Tr., p.7, L.17 – p.9, L.6.) Deputy
Jakich later testified that he believed Mr. Howard was stealing firewood from the National Forest
and selling it, and that at the time of the stop he believed Mr. Howard was on his way to deliver
stolen wood to a buyer.

(Tr., p.9, Ls.14-16.)

Deputy Jakich radioed a backup officer,

Washington County Sheriff’s Deputy Brendan Laudermilk, and said he was going to stop
Mr. Howard if there was no “wood ticket” visible on the back of the trailer. (Tr., p.34, Ls.4-8.)
Deputy Jakich followed behind Mr. Howard and, observing no attached ticket, decided to
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conduct a traffic stop. (Tr., p.9, L.17.) As the result of the stop, the deputies obtained physical
evidence and statements, and based on that evidence, the State charged Mr. Howard with
possessing controlled substances and transporting forest products without a permit. (R., pp.11,
14; Tr., p.34, Ls.21-25.)
Mr. Howard filed a motion to suppress arguing he was unreasonably seized in violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights. (R., pp.39-47.) He argued the seizure was unreasonable
because the facts possessed by Deputy Jakich at the time of the stop did not support a reasonable
suspicion that he had violated any traffic law, or was otherwise engaging in criminal activity.
(R., pp.39-47.) In his written memorandum, he particularly argued that the lack of a visible
Forest Service wood load ticket did not provide the deputy with a legal basis to effect the stop
because: (1) the permit-display requirement is a federal requirement that applies only to wood
taken from the National Forest, and there was no reason to believe the firewood had come from
the National Forest rather that from private land (R., pp.42-44); and (2) the permit’s dictate that a
U.S. Forest Service load ticket must be attached is unconstitutionally vague and did not apply to
his case. (R., pp.44-46). The State did not file a written response to the motion. (See generally
R.)
At the suppression hearing, Deputy Jakich testified that he conducted the stop for two
reasons: he had seen “no wood ticket” on the back of the trailer (Tr., p.9, Ls.21-25; Exhibits, p.1)
(see also Tr., p.34, Ls.6-8); and he suspected Mr. Howard “was stealing a Forest Service
product” (Tr., p.9, Ls.14-20).1 Deputy Jakich testified to conversations with his law enforcement
colleagues, who had information from a Forest Service officer about the rise in wood theft from

1

Deputy Jakich testified he observed no traffic violations or other law violations that gave him
suspicion to pull over the vehicle. (Tr., p.11, Ls.9-12.)
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the National Forest. (R., pp.55-56; Tr., p.13, L.13 – p.22, L.25.) Deputy Jakich said, according
to his colleagues, the culprits were stealing the firewood from the National Forest and selling it.
(Tr., p.14, Ls.5-9.) He testified he was told the culprits were selling the wood “without their
commercial permit.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.9-17.) The culprits’ method was to remove the wood from
the forest without marking the wood load tickets, which is required by the Forest Service
Removal Permit, and then reusing the tickets, which is prohibited by the permit. (Tr., p.14, Ls.920; Exhibits, pp.2-3.) His colleagues also told him that the culprits were “moving at night for the
most part.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.8-10.)
When asked what he knew about Mr. Howard specifically, Deputy Jakich testified he had
seen a post on Facebook advertising that Mr. Howard was selling firewood, specifically Red Fir,
along with a picture of Mr. Howard cutting a tree. (Tr., p.20, L.24 – p.21, L.6.) However,
Deputy Jakich also testified nothing in the post indicated the wood came from a National Forest.
(Tr., p.20, L.24 – p.21, L.6.)
Deputy Jakich also testified that at the time he conducted the stop, he knew of only one
other time that Mr. Howard had transported wood. (Tr., p.19, L.2 – p.21, L.10.) On that
occasion, which was three weeks earlier, Deputy Loudermilk encountered Mr. Howard as he was
coming out of the National Forest2 with wood and an unmarked load ticket. (Tr., p.19, L.2 –
p.21, L.10.) Deputy Loudermilk instructed Mr. Howard about the need to mark the ticket and
the consequences for not doing so, and then let Mr. Howard off with a warning. (Tr., p.19, L.2 –
p.21, L.10.)

2

Deputy Loudermilk testified Mr. Howard was coming off the West Pine area (see Tr., p.32,
Ls.15-20), an apparent reference to the West Pine Creek Area, in the Payette National Forest.
(See https://www.fs.usda.gov/recarea/payette/recarea/?recid=82745 (last visited March 27,
2021).)
3

Deputy Laudermilk testified regarding his belief that Mr. Howard might be connected to
the wood thefts. (Tr., p.23, L.22 – p.40, L.22.) He said he did not remember when, but “it started
just Nathan [Howard] to be on the radar for me,” and noted that Mr. Howard and his girlfriend
“had been causing other issues in the community prior to all this.” (Tr., p.27, L.12; p.26, Ls.34.) However, the only actual encounter he had with Mr. Howard related to the wood, was the
same incident to which Deputy Jakich had previously testified. (Tr., p.30, L.3 – p.33 –L.6.)
Deputy Laudermilk testified that since that event – which had put Mr. Howard on the deputy’s
“radar” – he had observed nothing that caused him to believe Mr. Howard was unlawfully taking
wood from the National Forest. (Tr., p.33, Ls.2-6.) Deputy Laudermilk also testified he learned
that the culprits would go up in the afternoon, get the wood, try to sneak it back to their house.
(Tr., p.28, L.13; R., p.56.) The will get it split, and they will try to transport it late at night to the
buyer. (Tr., p.28, L.13; see R., p.56.)
Additionally, both deputies testified to having observed Mr. Howard splitting firewood at
his property for months.

(Tr., p.21, Ls.12-14.) Mr. Howard’s house was on the main road in

Cambridge, and the deputies drove by it “all the time.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.12-14.) The deputies
testified they saw a lot of wood going through Mr. Howard’s yard and that he would unload the
wood, split it for use as firewood, and move it out. (Tr., p.21, L.11 – p.22, L.14; p.35, Ls.15-25.)
However, there was no testimony that the wood-splitting activity observed at Mr. Howard’s
house was improper or indicative of criminal activity. (See generally Tr.) On the contrary,
Deputy Loudermilk specifically testified that, aside his encounter with Mr. Howard three weeks
previously, he had no knowledge of conduct by Mr. Howard that caused him any concern.
(Tr., p.37, Ls.3-6.)

4

Following the hearing, the district court issued a written decision denying Mr. Howard’s
motion to suppress. (R., pp.55-64.) The court ruled that the facts possessed by Deputy Jakich
provided reasonable suspicion that Mr. Howard was stealing wood from the National Forest.
(R., pp.55-64.) The court concluded that Deputy Jakich could reasonably infer the wood on
Mr. Howard’s trailer had been stolen from the National Forest based the fact that: (1)
Mr. Howard had previously taken wood from the National Forest without a permit; (2)
Mr. Howard was being investigated for stealing from the National Forest; and (3) the lack of a
visible wood load permit. (R., p.59.) The district court concluded that these facts, together with
(4) the Facebook advertisement; and (5) the late evening hour, were sufficient to provide Deputy
Jakich with reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Howard was engaged in stealing firewood
from the National Forest. (R., pp.59-61.)
The court stated in need not address Mr. Howard’s arguments regarding the invalidity of
the purported requirement that a Forest Service load ticket be attached to the wood, “because
Deputy Jakich had reasonable suspicion even without seeing a load ticket on the rear of the
vehicle.” (R., p.61.) The court concluded that because Deputy Jakich had a reasonable suspicion
that Mr. Howard was stealing firewood, the deputy was allowed to conduct an investigatory stop
to determine if Mr. Howard had proof of ownership of the wood. (R., p.62.) The court denied
Mr. Howard’s motion to suppress. (R., p.62.)
Mr. Howard entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance,
expressly reserving his right to appeal the court’s decision. (R., pp.71, 73; Supp.Tr., p.8, L.6 –
p.12, L.16.) The district court gave Mr. Howard a suspended sentence of three years, with one
and one-half years fixed, and placed him on probation. (Supp.Tr., p.20, Ls.13-19; R., p.82.)
Mr. Howard timely appealed. (R., p.94.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Howard’s motion to suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Howard’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Howard asserts the stop of his truck was unlawful and violated his Fourth

Amendment rights. Deputy Jakich lacked a reasonable suspicion that the wood on Mr. Howard’s
trailer was stolen from the National Forest. Reasonable suspicion was lacking because the
deputy did not have a sufficient factual basis to that the wood came from the National Forest or
to believe that Mr. Howard had stolen it. Nor was the stop authorized by the purported violation
of a Forest Service permit. Ultimately, totality of the circumstances – the whole picture – does
not support a reasonable suspicion. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the district court,
Deputy Jakich was not justified in initiating an investigative stop. The evidence should have
been suppressed.
B.

Standard Of Review
When the appellate court reviews a district court’s order granting or denying a motion to

suppress, the standard of review is bifurcated. State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 772 (2019).
The appellate court “will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous,” but “may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in
light of the facts found.” Id. “Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo but
must be based on the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 309 (2019)
(quoting State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111 (2013)).
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C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Howard’s Motion To Suppress Because The
Officer Seized Mr. Howard Without Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, In Violation Of
His Fourth Amendment Rights
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend IV. When, as in this case, a defendant seeks to suppress
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal seizure, the defendant bears the initial burden to
show a seizure occurred. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004). Once it is established that a
seizure has occurred, the burden then shifts to the State to demonstrate that the seizure was
constitutionally reasonable. Id; accord Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1979).
It is well-established that the stop of a vehicle by a police officer constitutes a “seizure”
of its occupants to which the Fourth Amendment applies. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.
348 (2015); State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016). It was undisputed in the district court that
Deputy Jakich stopped the truck Mr. Howard was driving. (See Tr., p.9, Ls.11-15.) Therefore,
Deputy Jakich had “seized” Mr. Howard within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
State bore the burden to justify the seizure as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As set
forth below, the State failed to carry its burden.
1.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Demonstrating The Seizure Was
Constitutionally Reasonable

“[T]ypically, seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable. However,
limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when
justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is committing, or is
about to commit, a crime. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 499–500 (1983); see also
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112. “The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the
8

circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
While the United States Supreme Court has not dictated precisely what evidence a
government must produce, it has stressed that an officer must at least “articulate more than an
‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 123–124 (2000).

That articulation must include both facts and an officer's

“rational inferences from those facts.” Kansas v. Glover, _ U.S. _, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 1196 (2020)
(KAGEN, J., concurring).
The reasonable suspicion requirement “becomes meaningful only when it is assured that
at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more
detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search
or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.”

Gonzales, 165 Idaho at 673 (quoting

Terry, 392 U.S., at 21).
Because the “reasonable suspicion” standard “takes into account the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture,” the exculpatory facts known to the officer must also be taken
into account. Glover, _ U.S. _, 140 S. Ct. at 1196 (KAGEN, J., concurring).
In the present case, though the district court undertook this neutral inquiry, it erred when
it determined the stop was lawful because the officer lacked a reasonable, particularized
suspicion of criminal activity.

a.

The Lack Of A Visible Wood Load Ticket Did Not Justify The Stop, Nor
Was It A Fact That Added To Reasonable Suspicion

Deputy Jakich testified that one of his reasons for conducting the stop was that he had not
seen a “wood ticket” attached to the wood on Mr. Howard’s trailer. (Tr., p.9, Ls.91-25.) He
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testified he believed an attached ticket was required by terms of the Forest Service permit itself.
(Tr., p.9, Ls.21-25.) In connection with this testimony, the State introduced a sample Forest
Products Removal Permit and a sample “personal use” wood ticket, and cited the court to a
federal regulation, 36 CFR 261.6, as the authority for permit. (Tr., p.16, Ls.11-24, p.40, L.25;
Exhibits, pp.1-3.) The State argued no other legal bases for requiring the attachment of a load
ticket. (See generally Tr.)
Mr. Howard asserts, that the securely-attached-ticket requirement contained in the sample
Forest Service permit should have no bearing in the reasonable suspicion analysis of his case, for
multiple reasons.

i.

The “Securely Attached Ticket” Requirement Applies Only To
Wood From The National Forest, And The Deputy Had No Factual
Basis To Infer That The Wood On Mr. Howard’s Trailer Came
From The National Forest

First, the requirement that a load ticket be “securely attached” to the firewood, and
“visible,” is a federal requirement only, and by its own terms applies only to wood removed from
the National Forest. See 36 CFR § 261.1 (a)(1). The visible, attached ticket requirement does
not apply to firewood removed from private lands. (Tr., p.10, L.18 – p.11, L.1.) Thus, and
contrary to the district court’s reasoning (R., p.59), because Deputy Jakich had no articulable,
factual basis for inferring the wood Mr. Howard’s trailer came from the National Forest and not
from private land, he lacked a factual basis for suspecting Mr. Howard was violating the Forest
Service’s requirements. For this reason, the lack of a visible ticket is irrelevant and does not
justify the stop.

10

ii.

The “Securely Attached Ticket” Requirement Does Not Apply To
The Transportation Of Wood That Has Been Processed, And Does
Not Apply In This Case

Alternatively, even if the deputy could have reasonably inferred the wood came the
National Forest, the purported requirement for securely attaching a wood load ticket did not
apply in this case, where the wood has been processed for use. Therefore, the lack of a visible
load ticket did provide legal authority to conduct the stop, or support a reasonable suspicion.
Relevant here, federal regulations prohibit the removal of “any timber, tree or other forest
product, except as authorized” by a “permit.” 36 CFR §§ 261.2, 261.6(h), and specifically
prohibit “loading, removing or hauling timber or other forest product under any permit … unless
such product is identified as required in such permit.” 36 CFR § 261.6(e) (emphasis added.) The
permit, in turn, sets forth various requirements relating to the completion and attachment of “load
tickets.” (Exhibits, p.3.)
In the “General Conditions” section, paragraph 15, the permit states:
When load tickets are issued, the Permittee is required to complete load tickets
when Permittee moves between collection sites or leaves a permit area. Load
tickets must be securely attached to the load and clearly visible from the rear of
the vehicle.
(Exhibits, p.3 (emphasis added).)
In the “Other Conditions” section, paragraph 13 of the permit states:
Transporting firewood without first validating and securely attaching the load
tickets in a visible position on the left rear of the load for each ¼ cord of wood
products or any portion thereof, and/or failing to properly validate each load ticket
used by cutting out and completely removing the proper month and date is
prohibited (tickets are not reusable). 36 CFR 261.6(h).
(Exhibit, p.3 (emphasis added).)
Read together, these provisions require the Permittee to securely attach the wood load
ticket before (1) moving between collection sites or (2) leaving a permit area. (Exhibit. 3.)
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However, there is no requirement that the permittee securely attach a ticket to wood after it has
been processed. (Exhibit. 3.)
In this case, Mr. Howard was not leaving the permit area or moving between collection
sites when Deputy Jakich pulled him over; the wood the deputy observed on Mr. Howard’s
trailer had already been split into fireplace-sized pieces, ready for use. (Tr., p.7, L.17 – p.9, L.6.)
Since the permit does not require attaching (or re-attaching) a ticket after the wood is processed
for use, it did not require an attached ticket on Mr. Howard’s trailer, even if the wood had
originated from the National Forest. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that Deputy Jakich had a
factual basis for inferring the wood originated from the National Forest, the fact the deputy
observed no attached ticket did not provide, or add to, a reasonable suspicion that the wood had
been stolen.
iii.

A Suspected Violation Of The Permit’s “Securely Attached
Ticket” Requirement Is Unconstitutionally Vague, And Therefore
Cannot Provide An Alternative Justification For The Stop

Finally, and although the district court did not reach the issue, Deputy Jakich’s
observation that no visible load ticket was attached, did not provide the deputy with legal
authority to stop Mr. Howard for a permit violation.3 Even assuming, arguendo, that the deputy
could reasonably infer the wood on Mr. Howard’s trailer originated from the National Forest, the
purported requirement for attaching the load ticket is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the
transportation of wood, after wood has been processed for use.

3

Additionally, the deputy’s law enforcement authority did not extend to the enforcement of
federal laws, and he thus had no authority to detain Mr. Howard for suspected violation of a U.S.
Forest Service regulation. See I.C. §§ 31-2201, 31-2202, 67-2337 (stating sheriff’s authority to
enforce state laws and highway safety rules, and extending that authority under limited,
specifically delineated conditions.) None of the specifically delineated conditions are shown to
exist in this case.
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Mr. Howard argues that his case is similar to the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in
State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305 (2019). In Cook, the Court addressed a law requiring a driver to
place a temporary permit “upon the windshield of each vehicle or in another prominent place
where it may be readily legible,” and whether a violation of such law could provide reasonable
suspicion to conduct a stop.

Id. at 307.

The Supreme Court concluded the law was

unconstitutionally vague, in that it failed to adequately inform Ms. Cook what she needed to do
in order to comply. Id. The Cook Court explained that “[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine is
premised upon the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution”
and requires that law purporting to define criminal conduct “be worded with sufficient clarity
and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.” Id. at 309.
Because the law was unconstitutionally vague, the Court concluded that a violation of the law
did not provide the officer a basis for conducting the stop. Id.
In the present case, the permit’s requirement that a load ticket be “securely attached” is
unconstitutionally vague as to transporting processed wood. Thus, even if the deputy had a
factual basis for inferring the wood originated from the National Forest – which he didn’t - the
lack of an attached ticket did not provide legal justification for conducting the stop, under the
rational of Cook.
Thus, should this Court conclude, as argued below, that Deputy Jakich did not have
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Howard was stealing firewood from the National Forest, the
suspected permit violation cannot provide an alternative justification for the stop.
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b.

The Totality Of The Circumstances Known To Deputy Jakich Do Not
Support A Reasonable Suspicion That Mr. Howard Was Stealing Wood
From The National Forest

The totality of the circumstances known to Deputy Jakich do not support a reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Howard was transporting wood stolen from the National Forest. Deputy
Jakich acknowledged there was a lot of private land with timber in both Washington County and
neighboring Adams County, and he conceded he did not know whether the firewood on
Mr. Howard’s trailer had come from the National Forest. (Tr., p.30, L.19 – p.31, L.1.) While
Deputy Jakich had seen Mr. Howard’s Facebook post advertising that he was selling wood, the
deputy also testified there was nothing in ad to indicate the wood came from the National Forest.
(Tr., p.20, L.24 – p.21, L.6.) Nor did the deputy identify anything about the ad – for example, a
steeply discounted price, secretive terms of sale or delivery – to suggest that wood for sale was
wood that Mr. Howard had stolen. (See generally Tr.)
Moreover, Deputy Jakich did not testify to any particularized facts or inferences that
Mr. Howard lacked the permits, contracts, or other permissions necessary to split, sell, and
deliver firewood legally. (See generally Tr.) On the contrary and as previously stated, it was
undisputed that Mr. Howard had openly and actively been bringing firewood to his property,
splitting it, and moving it. (Tr., p.21, Ls.13-12-14; p.35, Ls.15-25.) There is no testimony that
these activities were illegal, or had gave the deputies any cause for concern. (Tr., p.37, Ls.3-6.)
Thus, though the district court stated broadly that Mr. Howard was “known to law
enforcement4 for taking wood without a permit,” (R., p.59), the court was necessarily referring to

4

Reasonable suspicion may be based on the officer’s personal observations, but also on
information supplied by another person. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014);
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009). However, an officer may also rely on the report of
another officer only so long as the person making such underlying report possessed the requisite
14

the single incident that had occurred three weeks earlier; Deputy Loudermilk specifically
testified he knew of no other events or encounters with Mr. Howard that caused him any
concern. (Tr., p.37, Ls.3-6.) Additionally, the single previous incident was the sole reason
articulated by Deputy Loudermilk for including Mr. Howard in the theft investigation.
(Tr., p.27, Ls.12.) Thus, contrary to the court’s reasoning (R., p.59), the fact that Mr. Howard
was “being currently investigated” ads nothing to the totality of the circumstances analysis.
Moreover, the “lack for visible permits” cited by the district court in support of
reasonable suspicion (R., p.59), provides no basis for inferring the wood came from the National
Forest, or for believing the wood had been stolen. As argued in the previous section, there was
no requirement that a ticket be attached to the processed wood that Mr. Howard was
transporting, and the fact Deputy Jakich did not see one is irrelevant, adding nothing to the
determination of reasonable suspicion. Should this Court disagree with Mr. Howard’s arguments
that lack of a load ticket is irrelevant, Mr. Howard submits the lack of the ticket should be given
very little weight in light of his arguments.
Also contrary to the court’s conclusions (R., p.60), Deputy Jakich’s observations on the
night of the stop, prior to the stop, were not “consistent with” the prior incident, and did not
“match the pattern of actions” observed by the officers during their investigation. In the prior
incident, Mr. Howard had just come off the National Forest was had stopped at a gas station;
Deputy Laudermilk testified that “he had his permits on the truck, but they weren’t marked.”
(Tr., p.26, Ls.11-9-13 (emphasis added).) Nothing observed by Deputy Jakich on the night of
the stop, prior to his conducting the stop, was “consistent with” that previous event.

reasonable suspicion. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); State v. Van Dorn, 139
Idaho 961, 963-64 (Ct. App. 2004).
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Rather, on the night of the stop, Mr. Howard, who was well-known for splitting wood at
his house all season long, was observed simply driving a load of split firewood down the
highway. (Tr., p.7, Ls.17-25.) Although the culprits also transported their wood at nighttime,
this common fact ads little or nothing to the assessment of reasonable suspicion.
Ultimately, taking into account all of the relevant facts, including the exculpatory facts,
i.e., “the whole picture, the reasonable suspicion standard is not met.

Lacking reasonable

suspicion, Deputy Jakich’s warrantless seizure of Mr. Howard violated Mr. Howard’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Based on the foregoing, this Court should conclude that the district court
erred in ruling that the stop was justified by the officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion.
2.

The Exclusionary Rule Required Suppression

Due to the unlawful seizure, the district court should have suppressed all of the evidence
obtained by the officer under the exclusionary rule, as the unlawful fruit of the poisonous tree.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (holding that evidence obtained
directly or indirectly through unconstitutional police conduct is subject to exclusion); State v.
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992) (same); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810–11 (same). The State
did not argue that any exceptions to the exclusionary rule applied in the district court, and
therefore is precluded from raising such an argument on appeal. State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,
226 (2019). The district court should have granted Mr. Howard’s suppression motion.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Howard respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand his case to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with his plea agreement.
DATED this 30th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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